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Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner:
Will the IRS Use a Nebulous Supreme
Court Decision to Capitalize on
Unsuspecting Taxpayers?
INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has long been at odds with
taxpayers over the characterization of expenditures as either currently
deductible, ordinary and necessary business expenditures, or as capital
expenditures that must be amortized, if at all, over the useful life of the
asset. Just when it seemed the courts had fashioned a bright line test to
settle these disputes,' the United States Supreme Court, in Indopco, Inc.
v. Commissioner,2 fashioned a new, more nebulous test that focuses on
future benefits and the taxpayer's purpose for making the expenditures.3
In Indopco, the Court used this test to find that acquisition fees incurred
by a target corporation to facilitate a friendly merger were nondeductible
capital expenditures because they created future benefits for the corpora-
tion.
This Note provides an analysis of the rationale behind the Indopco
decision and the potential impact the decision will have on various
corporate transactions. Part I describes the background of Internal
Revenue Code sections 162 and 263. Part II provides the history of
Indopco from the original transaction through decisions in the Tax Court
and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.5 Part III focuses on the Supreme
Court's reason for granting certiorari in Indopco, the rejection of the
"separate and distinct asset" test, and the formulation of a new "future
benefits and purpose of expenditures" test.' Part IV analyzes the potential
' See ifra notes 95-103 and accompanying text (discussing the "separate and distinct asset"
test).
112 S. Ct. 1039 (1991).
'See mfra notes 102-08 and accompanying text (analyzing Indopco and the formulation of the
new "future benefits and purpose of expenditures" test).
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 162, 263 (1988); mfra notes 9-36 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 37-73 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 74-108 and accompanying text.
802 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81
impact of Indopco on business transactions such as acquisitions, business
expansion expenditures, and advertising.7 Based on rulings issued since
the Indopco decision, Part V presents the IRS's position concerning the
deductibility of certain expenditures!8 This Note concludes that, even
limiting the Indopco decision to its own facts, the Indopco test may result
in the capitalization of expenditures where the taxpayer is unprepared to
satisfy the burden of proving the nonexistence of future benefits from
such expenditures.
I. BACKGROUND ON I.RC. SECTIONS 162 AND 263
A. Internal Revenue Code Section 162
Before delving into a full-blown discussion of Indopco and its impact
on deductions, capital expenditures, and business expenses, a brief
explanation of the relevant Internal Revenue Code sections on which
Indopco is based is necessary. Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code "allow[s] as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year m carrying on any trade or
business."' For any business expense to qualify as a section 162(a)
deduction, the expenditure must satisfy five requirements. The expendi-
ture must: (1) be "paid or incurred during the taxable year," (2) be an
"expense," (3) be an "ordinary" expense, (4) be a "necessary" expense,
and (5) be incurred "in carrying on any trade or business."'"
The Supreme Court has clearly defined these factors. The Court has
held that to be an "ordinary" expense for purposes of section 162(a), the
' Other types of business expenditures reach beyond the scope of this Note and include location
of white knights, hostile takeovers followed by a negotiated transaction, abandoned efforts or plans,
and stock redemptions. See mfra note 141 and accompanying text. For more background on hostile
takeovers followed by a negotiated transaction, see Victory Markets, Inc. v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.
34 (1992); Phillip Adams & J. Dean Hinderliter, Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner: Impact Beyond
Friendly Takeovers, 55 TAX NoTs 93, 99 (1992); see also United States v. Kroy (Europe) Ltd., No.
91-909, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1249 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 1992) (applying an "origin of the
transaction" test to determine whether loan fees incurred in a leveraged buyout were deductible);
McGee Gngsby & Cabell Clums, Jr., Indopco v. Commissioner: The Supreme Court Takes National
Starch to the Cleaners, 44 TAX ExEcTwE 85, 92 (1992) (providing additional analysis of
expenditures for abandoned efforts or plans); Adams & Hinderliter, supra, at 100-01 (presenting
further information on stock redemption transactions); infra notes 109-40 and accompanying text.
See mfra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1988). Section 162(a) generally allows the deduction of all ordinary and
necessary business expenses and in later subsections specifically delineates certain deductible
expenditures.
" See Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971) (holding that an
additional premium payment made pursuant to the National Housing Act did not meet the
requirements of a deductible expense).
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expense must be the common method of dealing with the perceived need.1
In other words, "[t]he situation giving rise to the expenditure may be unique
with respect to the particular business affected, but not uncommon in the
industry or business community as a whole."'" "The principal function of
the term 'ordinary' m section 162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often difficult,
between those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the
nature of capital expenditures, which, if deductible at all, must be amortized
over the useful life of the asset.'
' 3
In defining "necessary" expenses, the Supreme Court has held that those
expenditures that are appropriate and helpful for the taxpayer's business are
"necessary" expenses. 4 Thus, the "necessary" requirement is not one of
absolute need, but rather a requirement that the expense be of normal measure
to ensure the effective and efficient operation of the taxpayer's business. To
determine whether an expenditure meets the "in carrying on any trade or
business" requirement, the Court has held that "the origin and character of the
claim with respect to which an expense was incurred, rather than its potential
consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test
of whether the expense was 'business' or 'personal' ,,16
The remaining factors are capable of literal interpretation and the Court
has not found the need to judicially expound on their meaning. "Paid or
incurred in the taxable year" merely requires that funds be expended or legal
obligations created during the year for which the return is filed. That the
expenditure be an "expense" simply means that the value of the asset or
service, or a portion thereof; has been exhausted in the production of
mcome.'
7
B. Internal Revenue Code Section 263
Section 263(a)(1) states that no deduction shall be allowed for any
amount paid "for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase
" See Welch v. Helverng, 290 U.S. III, 114 (1933) (refusing to classify as ordinary and
necessary payments of a bankrupt corporation made by a former corporate officer in order to
strengthen the officer's business standing).
" Thomas F. Quinn, Takeover Expenses Incurred By The Acquired Corporation-Not Just
Another Ordinary Deduction: National Starch & Chenucal Corp. v. Conmmssioner, 10 J. L. & COM.
167, 171 (1990).
" Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1965) (admitting that attorney's fees paid to
defend a securities fraud prosecution are "ordinary and necessary" expenses and finding that
deductibility does not offend public policy).
" Welch, 290 U.S. at 113.
1 Id.
" United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963) (holding that none of the expenses incurred
in defending a divorce action were deductible).
" See Jack's Coolae Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 395, 402 (4th Cir. 1979).
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the value of any property or estate."'8 The "priority ordering direc-
tive of [sections] 161" and 261 requires that section 263 take
precedence over section 162." Section 263(a)(1) also includes
several specific exceptions to the general rule of nondeductibility,
among them an exception for expenses incurred in research, develop-
ment, conservation, and statutorily mandated expenditures.2" None of
these exceptions, however, is applicable to the issue discussed in this
Note.
The debate over classification as deduction or capital expenditure
has yielded no set formula.2 Instead, decisions are based on an
"appraisal of all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including,
but not limited to, the purpose, nature, extent, and value" of the
expenditure.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that "[e]xpenses incurred for the purpose of the
benefit of future operations are not ordinary and necessary business
expenses," and are, therefore, capital expenditures.' The nature of
expenditures as recurring or nonrecurring has been held to provide a
"26 U.S.C. § 263(a)(1) (1988).
19 See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 17 (1974) (declaring depreciation of
construction equpment owned by the taxpayer and used to erect capital improvements is not
deductible). The language of sections 161 and 261 when read together clearly mandates the
precedence of section 263 over section 162. Section 161 states:
In computing taxable income under section 63, there shall be allowed as deductions items
specified in tis part, subject to the exceptions provided in part IX (sec. 261 and
following, relating to items not deductible).
26 U.S.C. § 161 (1988).
Section 261 provides:
In computing taxable income no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of the
items specified in this part.
26 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
Section 263 does not apply to:
(A) expenditures for the development of mines or deposits deductible under section
616,
(B) research and experimental expenditures deductible under section 174,
(C) soil and water conservation expenditures deductible under section 175,
(D) expenditures by farmers for fertilizer, etc., deductible under section 180,
(E) expenditures for removal of architectural and transportation barriers to the
handicapped and elderly which the taxpayer elects to deduct under section 190,
(F) expenditures for tertiary injectants with respect to wich a deduction is allowed
under section 193, or
(G) expenditures for which a deduction is allowed under section 179.
26 U.S.C § 263(a)(1)(A)-(G) (1988).
" See Fall River Gas Appliance Co. v. Commissoner, 349 F.2d 515, 516 (lst Cir. 1965)
(discussng various factors- for determning deductibility as delineated in prior cases).
"Unites States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 690 (10th Cir. 1968).
"Farmers Union Corp. v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
861 (1962).
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crude but serviceable demarcation between business expenditures and
capital expenditures.24
The duration of the expenditure's benefit is given some weight in
determining whether an expense qualifies as a deduction or as a capital
expenditure. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
held that generally an expenditure should be capitalized if it brings about
the acquisition of an asset or an advantage to the taxpayer with a useful
life in excess of one year.' Other courts have held, however, that this
general rule is a mere guidepost and not an absolute that requires
capitalization of every expenditure providing a benefit of more than one
year.2 Furthermore, courts have recognized that "many expenses [that
are] concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable
year."'27 These holdings generally imply that if the expenditure creates a
benefit lasting more than one year that is substantial or is coupled with
other factors, the expenditure must be capitalized.
Although expenditures sometimes increase asset value, it is not
necessary for an expenditure to do so in order for the court to classify the
expense as a capital expenditure. However, if the value of an asset is
increased for a penod in excess of one year, the related expenditure will
more likely than not be considered a capital expenditure. 8
C. The Rationale Behind LR.C Sections 162 and 263
The rationale for distinguishing between business expenditures and
capital expenditures is to dimimsh the taxpayer's ability to mampulate the
computation of taxable income. By segregating expenditures into these
two categories, Congress has attempted to create a more consistent and
' See Encyclopaedia Britannmca, Inc. v. Conmissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982)
(holding that, contrary to the Supreme Court's statement in Welch v. Helvenng, 290 U.S. 111 (1933),
currently deductible expenses do not have to be normal or habitual); see also supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
"See Hotel Kingkade v. Comrmssioner, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1950) (holding that
expenses incurred to repair a hotel were capital in nature, not "ordinary and necessary").
Wehrli, 400 F.2d at 689.
Conimrssioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971); see Southland
Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 611 (Ct. CI. 1978) (affirming lower court's finding that
litigation expenses incurred to collect royalties and costs to prepare a study of oil reserves were
currently deductible but legal fees to settle a dispute over a leasehold were not), cert denied, 441
U.S. 905 (1979); Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222, 1263 (Ct. CI. 1969)
(analyzing the deductibility of itermized expenses incurred while acquiring the assets of the plaintiff's
bankruptcy predecessor), revd, Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
" See Georator Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 283, 285 (4th Cir. 1973) (finding that expenses
incurred resisting cancellation of a company's trademark registration would likely, if successful, result
io benefits extending beyond the tax period).
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accurate method of matching expenditures with the periods m which
revenues from such expenditures arise." A business expenditure, due to
its nature as ordinary and necessary to the taxpayer's business, provides
benefits and generates income only in the year m which the expense was
incurred." A capital expenditure, on the other hand, provides benefits or
generates income m years beyond that of the expenditure." If both types
of expenditures were currently deductible, the taxpayer would have the
power to shift income by strategically planning asset purchases.
To curb this power and to reflect more consistently and accurately the
taxpayer's net income for the year, Congress enacted sections 162 and
263, which (1) allow a deduction from the current year's income for the
entire amount of business expenditures and (2) require capital expendi-
tures to be capitalized and properly matched with the benefits and income
they generate through amortization or depreciation over their estimated
useful lives.32 Capital expenditures for assets without determinable useful
lives, such as goodwill, cannot be deducted through depreciation or
amortization.33
If the taxpayer is eventually allowed a deduction for both ordinary
expenditures and capital expenditures, ' why have so many disputes
arisen between the IRS and taxpayers over the classification of expendi-
tures? The short answer is that, practically speaking, a currently
deductible expenditure is more valuable to a taxpayer than an expenditure
that must be capitalized and deducted over a period of time. Moreover,
See Commssioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1974).
"See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of business expenditures.
', See supra notes 18-28 and accompany text for a discussion of capital expenditures.
"See Quinn, supra note 12, at 169 n.14, explaining the difference between amortization and
depreciation as follows:
Amortization describes loss in value due to the passage of time Depreciation refers
to the gradual reduction in value of property because of physical deterioration through use
A taxpayer generally amortizes intangible assets and depreciates tangible assets
For example, the taxpayer amortizes the cost of prepaid expense payments, such as
advance rental payments, over the useful life of the payments In the case of tangible
assets the taxpayer depreciates the cost over the useful life of the asset.
Id. (citations omitted).
"See Tress. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1992).
'4Id. No deductions are allowed for either ordinary or capital expenditures without a
determinable useful life.
"This is the "time value of money" principle. Generally applied, the principle demonstrates that
the more rapidiy expenditures can be deducted, the longer taxes can be deferred. The longer taxes
are deferred, the more money the taxpayer has with which to earn a return to pay off the deferred
taxes. Thus, if the taxpayer can defer taxes for eight years and earn a rate of return on its money
sufficient to allow it to double its money in eight years, the taxpayer will have paid no tax. See Note,
Fairness and Tax Avoidance in the Taxation of Installment Sales, 100 HARv. L. REv. 403, 403 n.5
(1986).
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if the assets are business acquisitions, and the acquisition costs are
deemed to be capital expenditures, they may not have tax value because
they will probably not have a determinable useful life. Consequently, no
deduction for depreciation or amortization will be allowed.36
II. BACKGROUND OF THE INDOPCO DECISION
A. The Indopco/Unilever Merger
On October 7, 1977, Unilever United States, Inc. ("Unilever")
indicated an interest m acquiring all of Indopco's stock in a friendly
merger.37 Unilever's board of directors first expressed interest at a
meeting with the chairman of Indopco's board of directors and Frank
Greenwall, owner of the largest outstanding interest in Indopco's stock.3"
Unilever indicated it would proceed with the tender offer only if
Indopco's board approved it and Greenwall agreed to sell Ins shares to
Unilever.39
Greenwall indicated that he and Is wife would dispose of their stock
in Indopco only if a tax free merger could be arranged.4" In an attempt
to satisfy Greenwall's desire, outside law firms for Unilever and Indopco
devised a merger plan that involved the creation of two new enti-
ties-National Starch & Chemical Holding Corporation ("Holding"), a
subsidiary of Unilever, and NSC Merger, Inc. ("NSC"), a subsidiary of
Holding.4" Indopco shareholders who wished to have a tax free exchange
would exchange shares of Indopco for shares of Holding.42 Any Indopco
stock not exchanged would be converted into cash in a merger of NSC
into Indopco.43 The merger agreement was contingent upon the IRS
issuing a favorable private letter ruling.4' The IRS issued the favorable
' The taxpayer can, however, include the nondepreciablelnonamortizable capital expenditure in
the basis of the company to determine gain or loss on the sale of the company. Nevertheless, even
this provides only a limited tax value because the sale of the company may not happen for decades,
if ever.
" See National Starch v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67, 69 (1989), afid, 918 F.2d 426 (3d Cir.
1990), cert. granted sub noma. Indopco, Inc. v. Conmissioner, Ill S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
" See id. at 69. Frank Greenwall, along with is wife, beneficially owned approximately 14.5%
of Indopco's outstanding common stock.
39 Id.
' Id. Frank Greenwall was the founder of Indopco. Greenwall and his wife were 81 and 79 years
old, respectively, and wanted a tax-free merger because of their low bans in the stock.
41 Id.
41 Id.
Id.
" Id. at 70.
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letter ruling and held that the merger would be a taxable sale to
shareholders who received cash for Indopco stock and tax free to
shareholders who received Holding stock for Indopco stock.4" The
merger agreement, therefore, satisfied Greenwall's request for a tax free
transaction.
While Unilever was prepanng the merger agreement, the proposed
merger was brought before a meeting of Indopco's board of directors."
At that meeting, Indopco's legal counsel advised the directors that they
had a fiduciary duty under Delaware law to ensure that the proposed
merger was fair to the corporation's stockholders.47 Indopco, therefore,
retained the investment banking firm of Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.
("Morgan Stanley") to value the stock and issue a fairness opinon.4
On July 10, 1978, Morgan Stanley delivered a favorable fairness opinion
letter to Indopco's directors.49 The merger agreement was approved by
Indopco's shareholders on August 15, 1978, and the transaction was
completed later that day."0
In connection with its work on the transaction, Morgan Stanley
charged Indopco approximately $2.2 million." In addition, Indopco's
outside counsel charged $490,000 for legal services related to the merger
transaction and $15,069 for out-of-pocket expenses.52 Indopco itself
incurred other expenses m excess of $150,000 related to the merger. 3
On its 1978 Federal income tax return, Indopco deducted, as ordinary
business expenses, the fees associated with the merger transaction.'
After auditing Indopco's 1978 return, the IRS denied the deduction of the
merger transaction fees and assessed a deficiency against Indopco 5
B. The Tax Court Decision
Before the Tax Court, Indopco argued that the merger fees were
deductible under the principles enunciated in Commissioner v. Lincoln
Savings & Loan Ass'n because they did not "create or enhance for [the
4 Id.
" Id. at 69.
47 Id.
41 Id. at 70.
" Id. at 71.
50 Id.
s, Id. at 72. The Tax Court found these fees, and all other fees associated with the merger, to
be reasonable in accordance with § 162(a).
" National Starch, 93 T.C. at 72.
5I Id.
54Id.
55Id.
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taxpayer] what is essentially a separate and distinct additional asset s)56
The Tax Court ruled that Lincoln Savings did not support Indopco's argument
because "the [Lincoln Savings] Court did not address the deductibility of
expenditures which do not create or enhance a separate and distinct asset."'57
Indopco also argued that the "dominant aspect" of the transaction
determined the deductibility of expenditures incurred as a result of the
transaction." Indopco asserted that the fiduciary duty owed to the sharehold-
ers was the dominant aspect of the transaction, and that the expenditures were
deductible because they were incurred as a result of that fiduciary duty.59
The Tax Court focused on the primary purpose of the merger m determining
the dominant aspect and found that "the dominant aspect was the transfer of
[Indopco's] stock for the benefit of [Indopco] and its shareholders."6 The
Tax Court noted that a Morgan Stanley report had concluded that Indopco
would benefit from the merger with Unilever because it would create the
opportunity for synergy, as well as access to Unilever's enormous resourc-
es." The Tax Court also determined that Indopco benefited from the
admimstrative convenience of fewer authorized shares and fewer public
reporting requirements. 62
The Tax Court concluded that the benefits arising from the merger were
"related more to [Indopco's] permanent 'betterment, and hence capital mn
nature 163 The court, therefore, classified the expenses as nondeductible
capital expenditures.
C The Court of Appeals Decision
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court's decision Indopco again proffered the argument that Lincoln
Id. at 77 (citing Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971)).
"Id.
Id. at 77-78; see also El Paso Co. v. United States, 694 F.2d 703 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (finding
expenditures for divestiture of corporate property were deductible); United States v. Transamenca
Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968) (creating a separate company that results in a "spin-off' or "D"
reorganization will result in capital expenses, not deductions); General Bancshares Corp. v.
Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1964) (holding that costs of issuing non-taxable stock
dividends were capital rather than deductible expenses); Mill'sEstate, Inc. v. Comrmssioner, 206 F.2d
244 (2d Cir. 1953) (detenmmng a partial liquidation was in essence a reorganization and expenses
therefrom were capital expenditures).
" See National Starrh, 93 T.C. at 78.
Id.
"Id. at 71.
Id. at 72. The Tax Court noted that subsequent to the merger, Indopco's certificate of
incorporation was amended to eliminate preferred shares of stock and to reduce the number of
authonzed shares to 1000.
Id. at 78.
" National Starch v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom.
1992-93]
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Savings established a new test for distinguishing between deductible
expenditures and nondeductible capital expenditures. Under the new test,
expenditures would not be capitalized unless they create or enhance a
separate and distinct asset.65 The court of appeals, like the Tax Court,
found that Lincoln Savings did not support Indopco's position.
6
Rejecting Indopco's primary argument, the court of appeals also
determined the proper treatment of Indopco's merger expenditures.67 The
court noted that "the sine qua non of capitalization, is the presence of a
not insignificant future benefit that is more than merely incidental. 's
Thus, according to the court of appeals, "capitalization is appropriate
where an expense produces a future benefit, that benefit is significant, and
that benefit is a purpose, rather than an incidental by-product, of the
expenditure."69 Whether the factors that determine capitalization are
present can be established only through a factual inqury. Because the
Tax Court had already performed the factual inquiry and had determined
that Indopco's expenditures were capital expenditures, the court of appeals
could not overturn the Tax Court's factual findings unless they were
found to be clearly erroneous.7" After concluding that adequate evidence
supported the Tax Court's findings that Unilever's enormous resources and
the possibility of synergy arising from the merger created future benefits
for Indopco, the court of appeals affirmed the Tax Court's decision that
Indopco's merger fees were not deductible."
In its opinion, the court of appeals noted that section 263 required the
merger fees to be capitalized even though the lack of an ascertainable
useful life meant the fees were not susceptible to depreciation or
amortization.72 Furthermore, the court held that expenditures meeting the
requirements for classification as capital expenditures must be capitalized
despite the fact that such expenses were required by law 73
Indopco, Inc. v. Conmmssioner, 1II S. Ct. 2008 (1991), aqf'd, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
Id. at 429.
"Id. at 431.
Id. (finding that the case presented a particularly difficult inqury because, as the court noted,
the expenditures in question "resulted in neither a tangible asset nor a readily identifiable intangible
asset"); see Ellis Banlng Corp. v. Comiissioner, 688 F.2d 1376, 1379 n.7 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding
that expenses for investigation of a company's financial position for the purpose of stock acquisition
are capital expenditures), reh g denied, 698 F.2d 1238 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207
(1983).
"National Starch, 918 F.2d at 431.
Adams and Hinderliter, supra note 7, at 94.
' National Starch, 918 F.2d at 432.
71 Id. at 432-33.
hId. at 434.
n Id., see Cominissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 359 (1971); E.I. duPont
de Nemours and Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1059 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding that order from
court to termnate interest in a company does not relieve taxpayer from requirement to capitalize the
[Vol. 81
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M. ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINION
A. Reason for Granting Certiorari
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari74 "to resolve a
perceived conflict among the Courts of Appeals."75 The Court noted that
decisions from the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth and Fifth
Circuits76 had consistently applied the Supreme Court's decision m
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n"7 quite differently than
the Third Circuit had m Indopco."
In Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner,79 the Second Circuit was
asked to determine whether expenditures to maintain a company's market
share by realigning its distribution system were ordinary and necessary
business expenses and thus deductible under section 162(a). In holding
that such expenditures were deductible, the court noted that Lincoln
Savings caused a "radical shift in emphasi" that established the mqury
as whether the expenditures created or enhanced a separate and distinct
asset.80
In NCNB Corp. v. United States,8 the Fourth Circuit considered
whether bank expenditures for expansion plans, feasibility studies, and
regulatory applications could be classified as currently deductible business
expenditures. Citing Lincoln Savings, the court determined that the
expenditures were currently deductible as "necessary and ordinary"
business expenditures because they did not create or enhance separate and
identifiable assets.'a Likewise, in Central Texas Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. United States,83 the Fifth Circuit was asked to determine whether
expenses of the termination); Woolnch Woolen Mills v. United States, 289 F.2d 444, 448 (3d Cir.
1961) (holding that costs of mandatory filtration were not deductible simply because required by
law).
See Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, liI S. Ct. 2008 (1991).
Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. CL 1039, 1042 (1992).
See Central Texas Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984)
(expenses for starting new branch of bank); NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir.
1982) (branch offices are expansions of new businesses, not separate assets); Briarcliff Candy Corp.
v. Comrmssioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973) (franchises are not separate assets).
" 400 U.S. 345 (1971); see supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining Indopco s inability
to use Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n as support for its argument).
n See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 782.
684 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 294.
"731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984).
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expenditures to acquire a permit to build additional branch banks were
deductible as "necessary and ordinary" business expenses. The court,
again citing Lincoln Savings, stated that the "question, therefore, is
whether the establishment of a new branch office creates a separate and
distinct additional asset."'
Contrary to the opimons of the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, the
Third Circuit, in Indopco, denied the applicability of the Lincoln Savings
"separate and distinct asset" test and focused instead on the purpose of
the expenditure and the significance of future benefits arising there-
from.85 Through its decision in Indopco, the Court intended to clarify its
decision in Lincoln Savings and to provide commentary to aid the courts
of appeals in reaching consistent decisions regarding the classification of
expenditures as either "necessary and ordinary" or capital.
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis of LR.C. Sections 162 and 263
The Supreme Court's opinion began with a discussion of the relevant
portions of Internal Revenue Code sections 16286 and 263,"7 addressing
well-established interpretations of the revenue statutes." The Court,
discussing the relationship between deductible business expenditures and
capital expenditures, reiterated that "an income tax deduction is a matter
of legislative grace and the burden of clearly showing the right to the
claimed deduction is on the taxpayer."89
The Court noted that capitalization is the rule and deduction the
exception: "Deductions are specifically enumerated in the Code and are
subject to disallowance in favor of capitalization."90 On the other hand,
capital expenditures are not "exhaustively enumerated," and § 263 serves
only as a method of distinguishing capital expenditures from deductible
business expenditures.91 The Court, therefore, reaffirmed that "deduc-
tions are strictly construed and allowed only 'as there is a clear provision
therefor." 92
" Id. at 1184 (finding, on facts similar to NCNB Corp., that expenditures to establish branch
banks did create a "separate and distinct asset").
to See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
U 26 U.S.C. § 162 (1984).
26 U.S.C. § 263 (1984).
"See Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1043 (1992).
"Id.
"Id.
"Id.
"Id., see Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
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The Court also delineated the five requirements for an expenditure to
qualify as a deduction93 and noted "that the 'decisive distinctions'
between current expenses and capital expenditures 'are those of degree
and not of lnd.'''s With tlus narrow characterization of deductions, the
Court made the circumstances under which the five requirements for
deductibility might be satisfied more difficult to achieve but made its own
decision considerably easier.
C. The "Distinct and Separate Asset" Test
To support its contention that the merger fees were deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenditures, Indopco maintained that the
fees did not satisfy the "separate and distinct asset" test established in
Lincoln Savings.95 Indopco argued that deductibility under section 162(a)
is the rule and capitalization the exception; this exception, according to
Lincoln Savings, applies only if the expenditure creates or enhances a
"separate and distinct asset."9 The Supreme Court disagreed with
Indopco and accepted the lower court decisions, stating that Indopco had
"overread" Lincoln Savings."7
In Lincoln Savings, the Court was asked to determine whether
insurance premiums paid to a Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation ("FSLIC") reserve fund were deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenditures. Because each insured institution
maintained a property interest in the reserve fund, the Court held that the
payments were capital expenditures that served to "create or enhance for
Lincoln what [was] essentially a separate and distinct additional asset
,,98
Indopco cited numerous courts that had taken this language to mean
that only expenditures that created or enhanced separate and distinct
assets were capital expenditures. 9' The Supreme Court commented that
Lincoln Savings stood only for the proposition that expenditures creating
or enhancing a separate and distinct asset should be capitalized under
section 263."M The Court stated, however, that although the creation of
"See Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1043-44; see also supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
"Id. at 1044 (quoting Welch v. Helvenng, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933)).
"See Brief for Petitioner at 16, Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
"Id.
,7 Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1044.
n Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 403 U.S. 345, 354-55 (1971).
"Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1043 n.5.
See id. at 1044.
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a separate and distinct asset may be sufficient to require capitalization of
an expenditure, it is not a necessary condition to capitalization."°' The
Court's holding thus sounded the death knell of the "separate and distinct
asset" test as the litmus test for distinguishing capital expenditures from
deductible business expenditures.
D. Formulation of the "Future Benefits and Purpose of Expenditures"
Test
The Court's rejection of Indopco's primary argument-that the
"separate and distinct asset" test controlled-required the Court to fashion
a rule for determining the nature of Indopco's merger fees. The Court
developed a two-pronged inquiry- (1) whether the expenditures created
future benefits and (2) whether the future benefit was a purpose, rather
than an incidental by-product, of the expenditure. Neither prong is
wholly determinative.
According to the Court, its previous statement in Lincoln Savings that
"'the presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is
not controlling' did not prevent using future benefits to distinguish
between ordinary business expenses and capital expenditures." 3 The
Lincoln Savings statement meant only that capitalization may not be
justified where a taxpayer realizes merely an incidental future benefit."°4
Applying the "future benefits" prong of its analysis to the facts in
Indopco, the Court held that "the Tax Court's and the Court of Appeals'
findings that the transaction produced significant benefits to [Indopco]
that extended beyond the tax year in question are amply supported by the
record." 05
The Court provided only a cursory discussion of the "purpose" prong
of its analysis. The Court supported this prong in its statement that "the
mere presence of an incidental future benefit may not warrant
... See id. (citing General Bancshares Corp. v. Comnmissoner, 326 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 832 (1964) for the proposition that "although expenditures may not 'result[ I in the
acquisition or increase of a corporate asset these expenditures are not, because of that fact,
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses").
See id. at 1044-45.
See Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1044 (quoting Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. at 354).
104 See zd. (noting, however, that the creation of benefits that extend beyond one year are
undemably important in the analysis of capital expenditures versus ordinary business expenditures);
see also United States v. Missinppi Chencal Corp., 405 U.S. 298, 310 (1972) (determimng the
benefit derived from purchase of stock requires capitalization of the expense); Central Texas Say. and
Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1183 (5th Cir. 1984) (requiring capitalization of
expenses incurred in starting new branches).
" Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1045; see supra notes 60-63, 68-71 and accompanying text.
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capitalization 11106 The Court noted, however, that Indopco's merger
fees were "'incurred for the purpose of changing the corporate structure
for the benefit of future operations,"' and such expenditures had long been
viewed as capital expenditures."0 7
Explaining the relationship between the "future benefits" and
"purpose" prongs of its test, the Supreme Court stated that expenditures
are characterized as capital in nature when "'the purpose for which the
expenditure is made has to do with the corporation's operations and
betterment for the duration of its existence or for the indefinite future
or for a time somewhat longer than the current taxable year " 0 It thus
appears that the Court will look at the combination of future benefits and
the taxpayer's purpose for the expenditure to determine whether the
expenditure may be deducted munmediately or must be capitalized.
IV THE IMPACT OF INDOPCO ON ACQUISITIONS AND
OTHER CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS
While the Indopco decision was specifically addressed to acquisition
fees in a friendly corporate merger, it potentially has much greater
implications. The decision suggests that the IRS may be able to argue
successfully the nondeductibility of other business expenditures such as
hostile corporate acquisition fees, business expansion fees, proxy contest
expenses and advertising expenses. The analysis of the potential effect of
the Indopco decision on these various business expenditures requires
application and historical analysis of Indopco, prior U.S. Supreme Court
tax cases, and various sections of the Internal Revenue Code. Although
the analysis may become complex at times, the basic principle is that the
Supreme Court, by fashioning a nebulous test to distinguish between
capital expenditures and ordinary and necessary business expenses, has
created uncertainty in the characterization of what were traditionally
deductible business expenditures.
A. Acquisitions
1. Friendly Acquisitions
Justice Blackmun indicated that the scope of Indopco was limited and
that each case involving capitalization versus deductibility "'turns on its
-- Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1044.
.0 Id. at 1045 (quoting General Bancshares Corp. v. Comnssioner, 326 F.2d 712, 715 (8th Cir.
1964) (quoting Farmers Union Corp. v. Cormussioner, 300 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 861 (1962))).
'- Indopco, 112 S. CL at 1046 (emphasis added) (quoting General Baneshares, 326 F.2d at 715).
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special facts."'10 9 Tis limiting language suggests that Indopco will not
prevent the deductibility of acquisition expenses m all friendly mergers.
The Court's language also provides taxpayers with a means to avoid
capitalization.
Justice Blackmun indicated that Indopco may involve a burden of
proof issue. Blackmun first invoked the "familiar rule that 'anincome tax
deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that the burden of clearly
showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.""'" Later,
Blackmun noted that Indopco had failed to prove that its merger fees
were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenditures under
section 162.2
Thus, if a target corporation can meet its burden of proof, as Indopco
failed to do, it might be successful in defeating the IRS's requirement that
acquisition fees are not deductible. A target corporation must gather
substantial objective data to support its claim that any future benefits
were insignificant or incidental to the acquisition. If the target corporation
can provide such data, it will meet its burden of proof and may deduct
the acquisition expenses as "ordinary and necessary" business expendi-
tures. To prove the nonexistence of significant future benefits, the target
corporation should focus on the categories of future benefits the Court
recognized in Indopco. Those categories were characterized as: (1)
resource-related benefits and (2) administrative benefits."' The resource-
related benefits in Indopco consisted mainly of the acquiring company's
enormous resources and the potential for synergy arising from combining
the two companies. The admustrative benefits consisted of reduced
shareholder relations expenses, reduced reporting and disclosure
requirements, and a reduced number of authorized shares-from eight
million to one thousand."' To escape capitalization of acquisition
expenses, a target corporation must prove that resource-related and
administrative benefits such as those that the Court found existed in
Indopco were either nonexistent or minimal in the acquisition in question.
Some acquisitions are instituted by acquiring entities that have no
significant resources, and thus produce no resource-related benefits to the
target entity. Typical of such transactions are leveraged buyouts, which
Id. at 1044 (quoting Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 481, 496 (1940)).
I Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1043 (quoting Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590,
593 (1943)); see Du Pont, 308 U.S. at 493; New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvenng, 292 U.S. 435, 440
(1934).
", Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1046; see also Gngsby & Chinnis, supra note 7, at 85-94 (examining
Indopco in detail and describing circumstances under winch the decision is applicable).
... Gngsby & Chnnms, supra note 7, at 85-94.
.' See id., see also Adams and Hinderliter, supra note 7, at 97.
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are often financed with debt by entities that have little or no resources.
Likewise, the acquisition of a target corporation by an entity m an
unrelated industry will provide no resource-related benefits because the
resources are so dissimilar. '14 Administrative benefits also are not
always inherent in mergers. Many leveraged buyouts, for instance, require
the issuance of "junk" bonds, which recur as many administrative
expenses as do publicly traded securities. Furthermore, privately owned
companies or wholly owned subsidiaries acquired m a takeover will not
experience the significant administrative benefits that result when a public
company is taken private."' Expenditures for these types of acquisitions
should be deductible under Indopco.
2. Hostile Acquisitions
In Indopco, the Supreme Court did not address the deductibility of
expenses incurred defending against a hostile takeover. Although the
Court provides no specific guidance, the argument for deductibility of
such expenses is stronger than the argument for deductibility of friendly
merger expenditures.
Analyzed under the "future benefits and purpose of expenditures" test
the Court used in Indopco, successful hostile takeover defense expenses
do not rise to a level requiring capitalization."" In Indopco, the two
major categories of future benefits were resource-related and administra-
tive."7 If a hostile takeover defense succeeds, no resource-related
benefits result because the companies do not combine to yield new
resources or potential synergy Likewise, no administrative benefits are
gamed because the intended target corporation does not experience the
reduction in shareholder relations expenses or reporting and disclosure
requirements that the acquired corporation in a successful merger
experiences when taken off the public trading block."8
' This possibility for avoiding capitalization hinges on a court's definition of resources. Courts
may, for instance, consider the management experience an acquiring entity brings to the targeted
corporation to be a significant resource. It is also true that leveraged buyouts, where the acquinng
entity has no tangible resources, are uncommon in the current business community so that such
acquisitions will typically provide the target corporation with new resources. The argument suggested
here, however, may be one of the few ways to avoid the potentially broad capitalization net Indopco
casts.
See generally Adams & Hinderliter, supra note 7; Grigsby & Clunms, supra note 7.
The exception to this rule may be expenditures made to find white kmghts. See Adams and
Hinderliter, supra note 7.
"' See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
"' But see infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text (regarding the IRS position on the
deductibility of hostile takeover defense expenditures). For a court opinion subsequent to Indopco
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If the hostile takeover defense is unsuccessful, however, the argument
is not as strong. Once the acquisition succeeds, the IRS may be able to
establish the existence of future benefits such as those that it proved in
Indopco. In flus situation, the target corporation must resort to the same
defensive tactics discussed m the context of friendly acqsitions.1 9 The
target corporation should, however, be able to successfully argue that the
"purpose" prong of the Indopco test was not satisfied because the
expenditures were not made for the purpose of changing corporate
structure for the benefit of future operations. It should be reiterated,
however, that the Indopco Court did not require that the expenditures
satisfy both prongs of the "future benefits and purpose of expenditures"
test.120
Moreover, authority indicates that the Indopco Court may allow
expenses incurred in an unsuccessful hostile takeover defense to be
currently deducted. Under one argument, expenses may be deducted if the
nexus between the expenditures and the future benefits is too tenuous.1
2
'
Although future benefits may have resulted from the acquisition, the
benefits were not derived from the target corporation's expenditures."as
B. Business Expansion
Corporations often make expansion expenditures to diversifyi m a
sluggish economy, to maintain market share in a highly competitive
industry, or to service a growing industry." Prior to Indopco, courts
generally held that such expenditures were deductible if not associated
addressing the deductibility of expenditures in a successful hostile takeover defense, see Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 30209-91 (1991) (involving an IRS notice of deficiency
challenging expenses incurred by Gulf Oil in connection with its unsuccessful takeover bid for Mesa
Petroleum Co.). See also Adams & Hinderliter, supra note 7, at 98 n.40.
.. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
m See Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1045-46 (1992).
1?? For further analysis of the "nexus" argument, see Grigsby & Clnnis, supra note 7, at 89-91.
See In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 135 Bankr. 950 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (explaining
the deductibility of fees associated with an unsuccessful hostile takeover defense). The case involved
the Campeau Corporation's hostile takeover of Federated Department Stores, Inc., and Allied Stores
Corporation. Judge Aug held that the hostile defense expenditures were deductible under § 162(a)
because "the decision to engage in a 'whiteknight' defense was an established, common and accepted
defensive move, and thus would be considered 'ordinary' in the context of a hostile takeover battle."
Id. at 961. Judge Aug also held that Indopco did not apply because it dealt with expenses incurred
in a successful friendly takeover. The Allied and Federated "mergers never matenalized, and thus
conferred no benefit, and the Campeau mergers resulted in the very antithesis of long-term future
benefit." Id. at 961-62.
' See generally Grigsby & Chinnis, supra note 7, at 85-91 (discussing the relevancy and
practical effect of the Indopco decision).
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with the creation of a separate and distinct asset."24 With the Supreme
Court's decision in Indopco, the deductibility of business expansion
expenditures may be severely limited, if not altogether prohibited.
In Bnarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commzssioner," the court found that
expenditures made to develop new sales territories were not capital
expenditures where the company was already a going concern and the
products sold remained the same.'26 The Briarcliff decision was heavily
based, however, on an interpretation of Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings
& Loan Ass'n as creating a new "separate and distinct asset" test for
capitalization. Thus, the Briarcliff court reasoned that if the expenditures
did not create separate and distinct assets, they were not capital expendi-
tures.' The Indopco Court's clarification of Lincoln Savings obviously
renders the precedential value of Briarcliff suspect.'28
NCNB Corp. v. United States'9 involved the same interpretation of
Lincoln Savings. The court in NCNB Corp. found that expenditures for
feasibility studies and regulatory applications associated with opening new
branch banks were an ordinary practice of NCNB's regular operations.'
Since the studies and applications did not create or enhance separate and
distinct assets, they were currently deductible expenditures.'
With the change Indopco has instigated, courts faced with the
scenarios of Briarcliff and NCNB Corp. may find that the only support
for those decisions was the erroneous application of Lincoln Savings. The
result will probably be required capitalization of business expansion
expenditures. On the other hand, courts might look beyond the invalidated
Lincoln Savings interpretation to find another argument to support the
continued classification of business expansion expenditures as currently
deductible. The remaining argument for deductibility is grounded in an
interpretation of legislative intent behind the enactment of Internal
Revenue Code section 195.132
Section 195 addresses the deductibility of corporate start-up expendi-
tures. 33 Historically, taxpayers were forced to capitalize such expendi-
U See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
"' 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
"' Id. at 781-82.
7 Id.
'a See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
12 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982).
"* Id. at 292.
.. Id. The court in NCNB noted that the expenditures for construction of buildings, purchase of
real estate and other tangible capital assets had been properly capitalized in the start-up of branch
banks.
"' 26 U.S.C. § 195(c)(1), (2) (1984).
.. Section 195 allows the taxpayer to elect treatment of start-up expenditures as deferred
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tures because section 162 did not apply until the trade or business began."3
Since the expenditures were incurred in the creation of the trade or business,
they yielded future benefits for an indefinite period and were not deductible
until the business was sold or abandoned.'35 Section 195 allows taxpayers
to amortize start-up expenditures over a sixty-month period only if the
expense would have been deductible if paid or incurred "in connection with
the expansion of an existing trade or business."'36 The language of section
195 evinces a legislative intent to make business expansion expenditures
currently deductible. If this were not the case, section 195 would be useless
because no start-up expenditure could satisfy the "otherwise deductible as a
business expansion expenditure" requirement.'37 Because Congress manifest-
ed an intent that business expansion expenditures be deductible, the courts
should not obviate that intent, through application of Indopco, absent a more
definitive legislative directive.
C. Miscellaneous Expenditures
Given the vague language of Indopco, the IRS conceivably could try to
attack the deductibility of many types of business expenditures. The two most
prevalent expenditures at risk are advertising expenses and proxy contest
expenses.
Often, advertising campaigns produce benefits to the company for more
than one year in the form of product or company goodwill. While courts and
the IRS have long recognized advertising expenditures to be currently
deductible,'38 the "future benefits" analysis of Indopco may lead to capital-
ization in the future.'39
expenses through amortization and monthly deduction of those start-up costs over a rmmum 60-
month period. If, prior to the end of this deduction period, the taxpayer totally disposes of the trade
or business for winch a § 195 election was made, then the remaining undeducted amount of start-up
"may be deducted to the extent allowable under section 165." 26 U.S.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980). For
purposes of § 195, "start-up expenditures" are amounts incurred in relation to the investigation,
creation or acquisition of an active trade or business, which amounts would have been deductible in
the year incurred. There are additional definitions to deternmne whether particular actions constitute
the "begnmng" of a trade or business, and when a § 195 election must be made. 26 U.S.C. §
195(c)(1), (2) (1984).
" Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir.), vacated, 382 U.S.
68 (1965).
Id. at 907-08.
26 U.S.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980).
.. For a detailed analysis of the "§ 195 defenses," see George B. Javaras & Todd F. Mayies,
Business Expansion and Protection m the Post-Indopco World, 55 TAX NoTs 971, 974-76 (19?2);
Do Briarcliff Candy and Code Section 195 Stiff National Starch?, 49 TAx NoTEs 1223-29 (1990).
"' See Brallier v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 382 (1986); Sheban v. Commisnoner, 29
T.C.M. (CCH) 727 (1970); Rodgers Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 66 (1950); Pnv. Ltr. t.ul.
81-35-031 (May 29, 1981); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(a)(2) (1969).
"' This result is unlikely given Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-39 I.R.B. 8 (holding that advertism
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The expense of proxy contests also could be changing from a
currently deductible expense to a capital expenditure. Proxy contests
involve battles among shareholders for control of the corporation. The
most promising case for the IRS is a proxy contest that results m a
change of corporate control. If corporate control changes, the IRS could
argue that new and Improved management policies create future benefits,
as in Indopco. Such an argument would be subject to the taxpayer's claim
that, as with successful takeover defenses, the expenditures were incurred
to maintain the status quo and no future benefits inured to the corpora-
tion. Despite the Court's prior acceptance of the deductibility of advertis-
ing expenses and proxy contest expenses, both now may be in jeopardy
of capital expenditure treatment.4
To date, the IRS has not attempted an aggressive application of
Indopco to either advertising expenses or proxy contest expenses.
Nonetheless, the reasoning of the Court m Indopco has put every taxpayer
on notice that a whole new classification of expenditures may be fair
game for capitalization.
V WHERE THE IRS STANDS FOLLOWING INDOPCO
During the adjudication of Indopco and subsequent thereto, the IRS
issued or revised some technical advice memoranda and revenue rulings
to clarify many of the concerns raised since the Indopco opinion. The
most active area for change has been business acquisitions.
In March of 1989, the IRS issued technical advice memorandum
('TAM") 89-27-005.141 This TAM, issued just four months before
Indopco's complaint was filed in the Tax Court, involved a target
corporation's expenditures to oppose a hostile takeover attempt by
locating a white light.14 The IRS ruled that such expenditures were
expenses are still deductible under Indopco).
" For a discussion of pnor treatment of such expenditures, see Central Foundry Co. v.
Coinussioner, 49 T.C. 234 (1967); Locke Mfg. Co. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn.
1964); Rev. Rl. 67-1, 1967-1 C.B. 28; Pnv. Ltr. Rul. 66-06-249460A (June 24, 1966).
141 Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (Mar. 27, 1989). A technical advice memorandum is the IRS's
opinion regarding the tax consequences of a transaction proposed by a taxpayer. According to I.R.C.
§ 6110O(X3) (1984), technical advice memoranda may not be cited as precedent.
.. A white knight is a third party, typically a corporation, that agrees to acqwre a target
corporation, usually at the target corporation's request, as an alternative to a hostile takeover by
another bidder. Target corporations seek out white kights because the merger generally offers terms
more favorable to the target corporation's management and a igher price per share to stockholders.
In exchange for becoming a white knight, however, most corporations require concessions from the
target corporation such as indemnification for potential lawsuits ansing from the transaction and
reimbursement of transaction fees. See Frank S. Hamblett, Note, The Impact of Schreiber on the SEC
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not made m order to change the corporate structure, but to maintain
profitability and fulfill the directors' fiduciary duty to the shareholders.
The expenditures, therefore, were deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses. Immediately following the Indopco decision by the
Tax Court, the IRS issued TAM 89-45-003," revoking TAM 89-27-005
as mconsistent with the Indopco decision. The IRS noted that the
fulfillment of the fiduciary duty was not controlling and that the expenses
incurred resulted m a long-term benefit.'"
The IRS refined its position on deductibility of corporate expenses
with TAM 90-43-003 and 90-43-004.' In both memoranda, the IRS
determined that expenditures relatmg directly to resistance of unfriendly
takeover bids were deductible under section 162(a), but expenditures to
find a white knight' 4 and to facilitate the acquisition of the target
company stock were required to be capitalized. Following the Third
Circuit's affirmation of the Tax Court's decision, the IRS issued TAM 91-
44-042,"4 which represents the Service's current position on the charac-
terization of expenditures incurred in business acquisitions. The memoran-
dum requires allocation of expenditures based on the services performed,
and the expenses must be capitalized if the service is performed m
connection with a transaction that produces a long-term benefit."
The IRS also has issued other advisory memoranda since the Supreme
Court's decision in Indopco. In TAM 92-37-006,"'9 the IRS held that
expenditures for a prudency audit conducted by an electrical utility for
rate-making purposes were currently deductible. The Service found that
Indopco was not controlling in this case because the prudency audit
produced no long-term benefit."s A significant factor in the decision
was that the utility regularly incurred substantial expenses in performing
audits to establish new rates. The IRS found that the "future benefit" of
increased rates was a result of expenditures for new plant and equipment
that had been properly capitalized.'
In TAM 92-40-004, I 2 the IRS held that expenditures to replace
asbestos insulation in manufacturing equipment are one-time expenditures
Tender Offer Timing Rules, 57 Geo. WAsHi. L. RLv. 77, 84 n.45 (1988).
Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-45-003 (Aug. 1, 1989).
Id.
Tech. Adv. Mew. 90-43-004 (July 9, 1990); Tech. Adv. Mern. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990).
'"See supra note 142 and accompanying text
Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (July 1, 1991).
" Id.
"' Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-37-006 (Apr. 24, 1992).
150 Id.
1$1 Id.
... Tech. Adv. Mer. 92-40-004 (June 30, 1992).
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that result in significant change to the property and must be capitalized.
The Service's rationale was that the expenditures produced future benefits
including safer working conditions for employees, reduced risk of liability
for the corporation, and increased marketability of the equipment.53
Finally, in Revenue Ruling 92-80," the IRS stated that the Indopco
decision does not affect the treatment of advertising costs as business
expenses that generally are deductible under section 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code. The exception to this general rule is in cases where the
advertising is aimed at obtaining future benefits significantly beyond
those associated with ordinary advertising.1
5
Although they provide the taxpayer with some guidance, the IRS
rulings are merely interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code. As the
Indopco case illustrated, courts have the power to overrule these
interpretations if they find them to be incorrect. The wary taxpayer,
therefore, should be prepared in all areas of business transactions to
defend against an IRS challenge and a broad definition of "future
benefit."
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision m Indopco ended the conflict among
the circuits over the proper interpretation of Commissioner v. Lincoln
Savings & Loan Ass'n. As is often the case in tax decisions, however,
the Court's decision may have created more uncertainty than it resolved.
By casually placing on the taxpayer the burden of proving the
nonexistence of future benefits, the Court suggests that Indopco may have
hinged on a taxpayer's failure to meet its burden of proof. Moreover, the
Court's rejection of Bnarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner'57 and
NCNB Corp. v. United States15 calls into question the deductibility of
business expansion expenditures and other traditionally deductible
business expenditures.
In an effort to hedge the opinion against future attack, the Supreme
Court instructed that the scope of Indopco should be limited due to the
lughly factual nature of the inquiry. Such qualified decision making by
I d.
"' Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-39 I.1.B. 8.
"' See, eg., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 231-34 (1975) (if
advertising predominantly contributes to acquisition of capital assets, cost is not deductible for the
taxable year but must be amortized over its expected penod).
" See supra notes 74-108 and accompanying text.
.. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
". See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court has perpetuated the fog of uncertainty surrounding the
expenditure characterization dilemma. As a result, Indopco's only
guidance to taxpayers is that courts will now employ a nebulous "future
benefits and purposes of expenditure" test, and the taxpayer must be
prepared to prove the nonexistence of future benefits, or lose the tax
benefits of potential deductions.
Bryan Matingly
